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How does a unit prepare for stability operations and support operations (SOSO) missions with high-intensity conflict operations occurring daily. This article incorporates the initial lessons learned from the 1st Armored Division (...
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How does a unit prepare for stability operations and support operations (SOSO) missions with high-intensity conflict operations occurring daily. This article incorporates the initial lessons learned from the 1st Armored Division (1AD) Engineer Brigade ope ...
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The Defense Language Office (DLO) tasked MITRE Corporation and the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) to jointly address questions concerning the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) ability to measure and track langu...
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The Defense Language Office (DLO) tasked MITRE Corporation and the RAND National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) to jointly address questions concerning the U.S. Department of Defense's (DoD's) ability to measure and track language, regional expertise, and culture (LREC) training and capabilities for general purpose forces (GPF). The objective of this task is to provide information to policymakers about the available data to track LREC training and skills, as well as available information on how LREC affects readiness and mission accomplishment. To reach the stated objective, the following research questions were addressed: (1) According to the best available data, what is the relevance of LREC training and capabilities to overall unit readiness and mission accomplishment; (2) How does DoD currently track LREC training and capabilities of GPF; (3) To what extent does this tracking adequately reflect unit readiness and the ability to accomplish missions; and (4) How can DoD improve tracking of LREC training and capabilities to adequately reflect unit readiness. Chapter 2 describes the methodology and data used in the study. Chapter 3 addresses the first research question and uses available data to assess the importance of LREC training and skills for mission readiness and mission accomplishment. Chapter 4 addresses the second research question and addresses how DoD currently tracks LREC training and skills and whether or not that tracking adequately reflects mission readiness. Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the findings and offers recommendations for linking LREC training and skills to mission readiness and success. In addition, we include four appendixes. Appendix A lists the policies and directives we reviewed for this analysis. Appendix B lists our interviewees, and Appendix C provides the interview questions we used. Appendix D details the confidence intervals for our analysis of the Status of Forces Survey of Active- Duty Members (SOF-A).
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Appreciating the need to institutionalize mission command in today s Army is easy given the future described by General Martin E. Dempsey above. As leaders, we spend a great deal of time discussing the significance of mission comm...
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Appreciating the need to institutionalize mission command in today s Army is easy given the future described by General Martin E. Dempsey above. As leaders, we spend a great deal of time discussing the significance of mission command. Current doctrine, as described in FM 6-0, Mission Command, is sufficient for a military organization to accomplish its mission. However, does it inform us as to how to institutionalize mission command and develop leaders who exercise disciplined initiative, as called for by General Dempsey. Army doctrine mentions the need to develop leaders who are empowered to exercise initiative. It does not currently describe a way to do that. We believe that we have found a method for establishing a shared vision across a unit that is useful in all operational environments, integrates all necessary functions of the organization, and addresses the question of how we harness the skills of today s young tactical leaders-officers and NCOs-who came of age during this time of war. The shared vision offers a way to develop them as leaders for the future. We argue that commanders should not act alone to understand and visualize the mission. By allowing subordinates to be involved in this process, we achieved shared understanding and initiative far sooner, and more efficiently, than our doctrine describes. We have tested this method during garrison training, major field exercises, and our recent deployment in Operation New Dawn in Iraq, which served as a final proof of concept. We found that our approach to mission command: (1) Developed critical thinkers; (2) Established ownership at all levels; (3) Developed a proactive staff; (4) Established a predictable environment; (5) Clearly established priorities; and (6) Produced flexible and adaptive subordinate units.
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This thesis examines the decision-making processes used by company grade officers operating in combat roles in Iraq and seeks to determine if innovation largely originates among lower ranking officers. The author analyzes the ince...
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This thesis examines the decision-making processes used by company grade officers operating in combat roles in Iraq and seeks to determine if innovation largely originates among lower ranking officers. The author analyzes the incentives structure and the command climate of the U.S. Army in Iraq and how officers operate within this environment. Interviews with officers who served in Iraq illuminate the motivations for innovation. The thesis identifies the many obstacles that officers encounter in attempting to 'innovate from below.'.
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In October 1993, the Quick Reaction Force Headquarters in Mogadishu, Somalia, observed that 'convoys are more vulnerable to attack than ground maneuver forces and should be planned and executed as a combat operation.' During the p...
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In October 1993, the Quick Reaction Force Headquarters in Mogadishu, Somalia, observed that 'convoys are more vulnerable to attack than ground maneuver forces and should be planned and executed as a combat operation.' During the period from 1993 to 2012, every major U.S. Army operation confirmed this reality. Logistics forces conducting ground convoys suffered 17% (167 soldiers) of all Army personnel killed in action during Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom between Nov 2001 and Sep 2010. Whether high intensity, as experienced during the March 2003 Iraq invasion, or low intensity, as seen during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from 1994 to 1995, sustainment organizations were required to conduct supply distribution operations with armed convoy escorts. Based on the enduring concept of AirLand Battle introduced in the 1980s with Field Manual 100-5, it was assumed that the Army conducted convoys as a rear-area operation and that the rear area was secure. Sustainment brigade doctrine, published in 2009, countered that claim, indicating that supply routes are assumed to be insecure in high-threat areas. This monograph posits that when externally resourced convoy escorts are used, the sustainment brigade commander assumes risk with his distribution mission, and when internally resourced convoy escorts are used, the commander has complete control over convoy unity of command, home station training, and convoy cohesion. The monograph examines multiple options available to operational-level planners when building theater distribution capability. It focuses on the benefits and shortfalls of both internal and external armed convoy escorts. It also provides historical examples of convoy operations in asymmetrical environments and the associated security challenges. Finally, the monograph offers multiple convoy security solutions for operational planners, force managers, and the sustainment doctrine community to consider for review and implementation.
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This historical publication demonstrates the utility and flexibility of flight test as illustrated by the developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) project conducted in 2005 and 2006 in support of U.S. Central Command and the Iraqi...
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This historical publication demonstrates the utility and flexibility of flight test as illustrated by the developmental test and evaluation (DT&E) project conducted in 2005 and 2006 in support of U.S. Central Command and the Iraqi Air Force. The Comp Air 7SLX (CA-7) aircraft was an experimental aircraft, also known as a homebuilt or kitplane, built from a kit manufactured by Aero Comp Inc. While deployed to Kirkuk Air Base (AB), Iraq to conduct developmental test and evaluation (DT&E), personnel from the Air Force Flight Test Center (AFFTC) and 412th Test Wing (412 TW) at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), California, and other units assigned to Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) faced hardships and dangers not usually encountered in DT&E, as well as fundamental problems in accomplishing the project in a combat zone. The project illustrated the types of tasks a flight test program entailed. These included securing funding, determining the appropriate aims and scope of the flight test program, ensuring the safe conduct of flight test at Edwards AFB, California and Kirkuk AB, Iraq, and collecting data to support a final recommendation. The CA-7 project demonstrated that the personnel of AFFTC and 412 TW could conduct flight test wherever and whenever needed, using whatever tools and resources were available. Despite the hazards of the deployed environment and the lack of proper equipment, the flight test professionals accomplished their mission in accordance with the test plan and on schedule. Ultimately, the CA-7 project illustrated the importance in flight test and in the acquisition process of applying sound engineering judgments as the basis for decision-making.
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